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The Effects of Social Security Reforms on
RetirementAgesandRetirement Incomes
ABSTRACT
Recent changes legislated in the U.S. Social Security system are
changing the economic incentives to work and retire. Someolder workers
will respond to these new incentives by retiring at different ages.This
paper evaluates the signs and magnitudesof these responses. Using a repre—
sentative sample of male workers, we investigate the pre—reform earnings,
private pensions, and Social Security profiles availableat alternative
retirement ages. Then we examine four specific changes in the structureof
Social Security benefits: raising the normal retirement age, delayingthe
cost—of—living adjustment, lowering early retirement benefits,and
increasing late retirement payments. Behavioral parameters areestimated
using an ordered logit model of retirement ages; these arethan used to eval-
uate how retirement behavior might respond to each of the fourreforms.
The largest retirement age response is observed for the policy changewhich
cuts benefits at the earliest ages and offers larger rewardsfor continued
work. This change would delay the average retirement age byabout three
months. The other reforms generate even smaller responses. Changesin
retirement ages of this magnitude will betosmall to compensate retirees
for reductions in benefit formulas. Thus the Social Security'sfinancial
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Introduction
In the last decade many countrieshave come to recognize that people are
devoting ever—shorter portions oftheir lives to work despite living ever
longer. Lengthening retirement periodsimply growing financial pressure onboth
yrivate sector and governmental pensions,giving rise to heated policydebate
over what is to be done. TheUnited States Congress recently moved beyond
debate by legislating a series of changesin Social Security, the U.S. govern-
ment—sponsored pension program. This paper presentsan economic analysis of
such reforms. In so doing, we also providean overview of the determinantsof
retirement ages and retirement incomes,which should prove useful to economic
analysts interested in evaluatingother pension reform proposals indifferent
contexts.
The estimates presented below incorporate
complex budget sets and pre—
ferences which have been observedin previous retirement studies.Governmental
and private pension schemes are highlycomplex; see, for instance,Mitchell and
Fields (1984b) for the United States,and Zabaiza et al. (1980) for Great
Britain. Sections I and II of the present paperdetail the form and structure
of retirement income options confronting
older workers before and afterthe
reforms of interest.2
Regarding preferences, earlier research on retirement has shown that
workers are heterogeneous (Mitchell and Fields, l984a; Gustman and Steinmeier,
l983a). Same are work—lovers and some leisure—lovers. Our estimation method,
ordered logit, allows for correlation of preferences across retirement ages for
the same worker. The estimated parameters are presented in Section III.
The core results appear in Sections IV and V, predicting changes in retire-
ment ages and retirement incomes respectively. Of the specific reforms
examined, we find that lowering early retirement benefits has the largest impact
on retirement ages, while delaying cost of living adjustments or raising late
retirement credits have little effect. Increasing the normal retirement age has
an intermediate impact. Retirement incomes are affected most by increasingthe
normal retirement age, next most by lowering early retirement benefits, and
least by delaying cost of living adjustments or raising late retirement credits.
The model is partial equilibrium in spirit, examining changes in Social Security
holding constant pension and wage structures.
Conclusions appear in Section VI.
I. Retirement Incentives Prior To The Reforms
In order to understand how Social Security reforms will affect retirement
incomes and retirement behavior, it is first necessary to construct the inter—
temporal budget set facing older workers prior to the reforms. Unfortunately,
there are no publicly available data which can be used to determine income
streams or retirement patterns for the current cohort of older workers.
Instead, we draw on an earlier data file of workers known as the Longitudinal
Retirement History survey (LRIfS) and update this file to reflect the positions
of workers currently reaching retirement age.3
The LRHS file is a longitudinal data set first fielded by the U.S. govern-
ment in 1969, covering several thousand older individuals and their spouses.
From the group originally surveyed we selected a sample of 1024 white married
male employees between the ages of 59 and 61 in 1969. The age group restriction
ensures that retirement patterns can actually be observed during the ensuing
waves of the survey; data were collected on these individuals through 1979. The
sample is also limited to employees since the concept of retirement is poorly
defined for self—employed persons. The bedridden and seriously ill are excluded
since economic incentives will probably play a rather different role for this
group as compared to the reasonably healthy group of older male employees.
Finally, we focus on a sample of private sector workers since we have no data
on occupational pensions for government workers.
The LRHS is extremely valuable for analysis of older workers' retirement
patterns since it provides a great deal of detailed information on income and
work patterns. Retirement is defined here as the age at which a worker left his
1969 job, computed by comparing each individual's job in later years with that
held in 1969.1 Earnings histories are provided in the survey from 1951 on-
ward; these were used to estimate what each individual could have earned if he
worked between ages 60 and 68.2 Earnings histories are also the basis for
calculating Social Security benefits, as described in Section II below. Private
pension benefits are somewhat more difficult to obtain, since the LRHS reports
only imperfect measures of benefits workers anticipate receiving upon retire-
ment. The survey did indicate when a worker would be eligible for such a
pension; this allowed us to proxy benefit amounts for retirement at age 65 using
industry—level benefits reported by Kotlikoff and Smith (1983). For retirement
at other ages, benefit amounts were adjusted using quasi—actuarial factors
reported by Schulz and Leavitt (reported in Burkhauser and Quinn, 1980).4
To estimate the effects of Social Security reforms in the 1980s, the LRHS
data must be brought up to date. This is accomplished in three simple steps.
(1) Earnings: Pre—tax earnings are adjusted upward by assuming that older
workers' wage profiles grew at the same pace as did the average worker's wage
between the l970s and 1982. Post—tax earnings for the synthetic cohort are
computed using federal income tax formulas and Social Security payroll taxes in
effect in l982. (2) Social Security: Social Security benefits are up-
dated by using the 1982 rules relating benefits to earnings during the worker's
lifetime.4 During the 19?Os, Social Security benefits rose more rapidly than
inflation due to inadvertent double—indexing. However, this has been corrected
so that real Social Security payments using the 1982 rules rise in proportion to
increases in the consumer price index. (3) Private pensions: Private pension
benefits relevant to workers retiring during the l980s are updated by computing
their value in 1982 dollars assuming no real growth. Since the earlier pension
profile showed that benefits fell in real terms after retirement, so too does
the updated pension profile. Net pension benefits are obtained by reducing each
worker's pension amounts by the federal income tax rate relevant to him using
the 1982 tax tables.
In all of these computations we develop the intertetnporal budget set in a
certainty framework. The empirical computations thus answer the question: what
income alternatives would the worker anticipate receiving in the future, as
viewed from the vantage point of age 60? This approach is consistent with
virtually all theoretical studieB of the retirement decision, and with all
previous empirical work. We are aware that such stochastic events as the onset
of ill health or unanticipated inflation render the environment uncertain.
Although retirement plans may change in reaction to such an unexpected event,
these changes have not been incorporated in the development of the intertemporal5
budget set. To analyze them in a more comprehensiveframework would require
stochastic dynamic programming, a task beyond the scope of the current liter-
ature and the present paper.
The components of the 1982 budget set thus devised appear in the top panel
of Table 1. Here are displayed the annual real income amountsthat a worker
with average characteristics (the "illustrative worker") would have anticipated
receiving if he retired at the alternative retirement dates depicted.All
figures are given in 1982 dollars. Retirement agesbetween 60 and 68 are the
focus of empirical attention since our earlier analysisdemonstrated that the
overwhelming majority of workers retire between these dates;in fact the average
retirement age for our sample is around age 63, with very few retiringearlier
than 60 or later than 68.
These calculations assume that the covered worker may receive a private
pension if he retires at ages 60 or 61, but consistentwith Social Security
rules, he must wait to file for governmental pensionbenefits until the age of
62. For other ages, benefits are computed assuming the workerfiles for Social
Security and private pensions in the year he retires.A married woman is
assumed to file for spouse's Social Security benefits when he retires, orwhen
she turns age 62 if she were younger than that.
The bottom panel of Table 1 provides the corresponding presentdiscounted
values associated with the flow given in the top panel. They are computed
incorporating the probability of not surviving tothe ace in question, and in
addition imposing a 2% real discount rate. Total lifetime incomeamounts net of
taxes are displayed in the last row of the Table, indicatingthe real value of
working until a specific age, and then acceptingthe coibpany and Social Security
pension after that.6
TABLE1.
COMPONENTS OF. THE 1982 PRE-REFORN BUDGET SET FOR THE
LRHS ILLUSTRATIVE WORKERa
(In 1982 dollars)
— IfRetirement is at Age:
ANNUALANOUNTS: 60
1. Net Earnings $16424 16265 16330 16012 15882 15952 15877 15845 15752
2. Net Private 837 9621356187518171896212821292069
Pension Benefits
3. Social Security
Benefit: Husband 537854015456596464817017 7307 76057610
Wife 254925792636272028232948306931903301
PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUES:
4. PDVE 0 15793 30803 45238 58770 71580 83836 95432 106406
5. PDVPP 4272 46976315831876577573 803675756914
6. PDVSS: Husband 67402 67697 68387 69242 69515 69341 66311 63173 59928
Wife 25126 25245 25482 25696 25836 25819 25429 24782 23842
TOTAL LIFETIME INCOME:b
[PDVY =(4)+ (5) + (6)196800113433 130988 148495 161790 174315 183613 190963 197092
-1Computations use 1982 Social Security rules; see text.
'Totals may differ from column sums due to rounding.7
The individual-level data underlying Table 1 are used in three ways in what
follows. First, they are used as a standard against which several Social
Security reforms may be compared. Second, they are used to derive predicted
retirement ages using behavioral estimates. Last, they are employed to predict
changes in income streams and retirement ages under the various reforms. We
take these up inturn.
II. Retirement Incentives In Four Reform Scenarios
Four specific reforms are simulated in this paper: Increasing the normal
retirement age, delaying the cost—of—living adjustment, raising the late
retirement credit, and changing the early retirement reductionfactor.6 In
order to evaluate how each alters retirement incentives, a bit of explanation is
needed on how Social Security benefits in the United States are determined.
A first step in computing benefits is to find each worker's Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings (AIME). The AIME is found by: indexing earnings up to the
Social Security taxable maximum in each year between 1951 and age 60; comparing
these to nominal earnings, if any, after that age; selecting the highest (for
example, a worker turning age 60 in 1982 would have his highest 28 yearsof
earnings included); converting to a monthly basis; and averaging.
The second step in calculating Social Security benefits is to determine the
worker's Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). In 1982, PIA was determined from AIME
according to the following formula:
9O of AIME up to "BEND POINT 1"
plus
32% of AIME between "BEND POINT 1" and "BEND POINT 2"
plus
15% of AIME above "BEND POINT 2."8
In real 1982 dollars, "BEND POINT 1" —$230and "BEND POINT 2"$1388, both in
monthly terms; in future years, the bend points will increase with theConsumer
Price Index (thus remaining the same in real terms).
The third step is to compute the worker's Social Security benefit as a
multiple of the PIA:
Worker's benefitPIA *multiple.
This multiple equals 1.00 if the worker is age 65 when he begins to collect
benefits; this is the "age of retirement" from the point of the view of the
Social Security system. Early retirement reduction factors are applied to
workers commencing benefits before age 65, and delayed retirement credits
awarded to workers waiting until after age 65 to retire. The multiples for
retirement ages other than 65 are determined from these early retirement
reduction factors and delayed retirement credits.
The final step is to add in spouse's benefits, if any. The wife is
eligible to receive benefits based on the worker's PIA. At age 65, she receives
a benefit equal to 50% of her husband's PIA, regardless of whether he retired at
age 65, earlier, or later. If the wife is 62 or over but not yet 65, she may
receive a reduced benefit; the reduction is at the rate of 8 1/3% per year.
The four Social Security reforms examined here operate primarily by
affecting the multiples. The 1982 rules and the reforms simulated are explained
with the aid of Figure 1. Here 1982 rules are depicted in the top panel and for
ease of comparison, are redrawn as lighter lines in each of the remaining
panels.
Under the 1982 rules, the early retirement reduction factor was 6 2/3 per
year and the delayed retirement credit 3% per year, both figured to the nearest
month. So for example, a worker retiring at age 62 would receive a Social
Security benefit that is 20% less than his PIA (6 2/3% reduction per year timesFIGURE 1. 9
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3 years under age 65); his multiple at age 62 is thus .80. That same worker, if
he waited to retire until age 68, would receive a Social Security benefit that
is 9% greater than his PIA (3% credit per year times three years); his multiple
at age 68 is thus 1.09.
The four Social Security reforms actually simulated can now be described:
Experiment A. Increasing the normal retirement age means that the indi-
vidual no longer receives his full PIA if he retires at age 65. We simulated
the effect of raising this age to age 68, as was widely proposed. (What in fact
was legislated was a change to age 66 by the year 2009 and to age 67 by the year
2027.) Under the simulated reform, the multiple becomes 1.00 at age 68 and the
early retirement reduction factor remains at 6 2/3% per year. Thus, the mul
tiples under this experiment are .60 for retirement at age 62 and .80 for
retirement at age 65, with corresponding reductions at other ages. (The 1983
legislation set a minimum multiple of 70%.)
Experiment B. Delaying the cost—of—living adjustment.
Rules in effect in 1982 specified that cost—of—living adjustments would
take place each July 1, reflecting increases in the Consumer Price Index during
the preceding calendar year. The 1983 Social Security amendments delayed these
increases by an additional six months. This six month delay reduces real
benefits by half the rate of inflation, or 2.3%. This reduction imposes new
multiples as shown in Figure 1.
Experiment C. Raising the late retirement credit means that benefits
are increased faster than 3% if retirement is postponed beyond age 65. We simu-
lated a 6 2/3% per year late retirement credit the same as the early retirement
reduction factor. The multiple for retirement at age 68 would have risen from
1.09 to 1.20. (As it turned out, in 1983, Congress mandated a gradual increase
in the late retirement credit, eventually reaching 8% per year as of the year
2009.)11
Experiment D. Changing the early retirement reduction factor simulates
a proposal tentatively put forth by the Reagan Administration in 1981. This was
to reduce early benefits by 15% per year, rather than by 6 2/3%. The multiple
for retirement at age 62 would therefore have been .55 rather than .80 as at
present. This proposal was initially rejected as politically unpopular and as of
this writing, has not been resurrected. Still, it is interesting to predict
what might have happened had it been enacted.
Table 2 presents the effects of the four policy experiments on the Social
Security benefits of the illustrative LRHS worker described above, while Table 3
reports their effects on total income (PDVY). In these computations the
earnings and private pension elements of the underlying budget set are assumed
to be unaffected by the simulated changes in Social Security structures. Hence,
the estimated impacts of the various reforms on retirement ages should be
thought of as partial equilibrium estimates, leaving aside possible responses of
pension plans and e2rnings profiles to changes in Social Security.
Increasing the normal retirement age to 68 (Experiment A) lowers retirement
benefits substantially as compared to the pre—reform scenario. Annual payments
fall by $1,000 or more regardless of when the worker retires. This translates
into PDVY streams which are lower by about $17,000 for people retiring in their
early 60s; the reduction is only somewhat smaller for workers deferring retire-
ment until age 65. Another effect of Experiment A is to tilt the Social Security
benefit structure. The system becomes actuarially more advantageous until age
65, such that delaying retirement from age 62 to age 65 actually increases the
present value of benefits by some $4,000. The experimental benefit structureis
also roughly neutral after age 65, in stark contrast to the pre—reform penalty.
In overview, then, increasing the normal retirement age as outlined here lower8
benefits at any given retirement age and provides new financial incentives to


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Experiment B, in which the cost—of—living adjustment has been postponed six
months, has a relatively small effect. Annual benefits are reduced by $lOO—200,
which translates into falls in present discounted values of at most $1,600.
Since the income amounts involved are small, this reform does not appreciably
alter the pattern of discounted benefit gains obtained by deferring retirement.
Experiment C raises the late retirement credit to match the early retire-
ment reduction factor. Benefits are increased after age 65, raising annual
benefits by as much as $800 at age 68. Present value at age 68 increases by
$6,000—--still not enough to achieve actuarial neutrality, but substantially
reducing the penalty (in PDV terms) for continuing to work beyond age 65.
Experiment D would have lowered early Social Security benefits, holding
benefits beyond age 65 the same. For a worker retiring at age 62 or before,
the annual benefit would have fallen by $1,700 and present discounted value by
some $21,000. The gain in present discounted value of Social Securitybenefits
for an extra year o work before age 65 would have been $6,000—9,000. This
reform would have created a powerful penalty for retiring early and a powerful
incentive for continued work. Yet, as we shall see, even those forces would not
change retirement ages very much.
III. Preferences for Income and Leisure
The next step is to evaluate how workers would be likely to respond to the
changes brought by Social Security reforms such as thosedescribed above. To do
this, it is necessary to obtain behavioral parameters indicatinghow older
individuals weigh income and leisure. An econometric approach that proved
fruitful in our earlier study (Mitchell and Fields, 1984a) is to model retire—
ment in a discrete choice framework. Following McFadden (1974), we positthat
the utility of the ith worker if he retired at age j is:15
—[ain PDVYjJ +B inRET1j)+ eij.7
The term in square brackets is the "strict utility" component for the average
person, varying of course with values of income and leisure at different ages.
The disturbance term eij is independent across people; this assumption is
quite conventional in labor supply models. In other contexts, it is also con-
ventional to require ejj to be uncorrelated across different choice alter-
natives for a given person, as for instance would be the case if the discret
choice model were estimated using a logit technology. However, in the retir—
inent setting, there is strong reason to believe that correlation between
unobserved tastes for nearby retirement ages may be important——particularly if
individuals are "workaholics" or "leisure lovers".
Allowing for this sort of correlation is feasible within a conditional
ordered logit (OL) setup, where the probability of choosing one specific
retirement age is allowed to depend on the attractiveness of immediately
adjacent retirement ages.8 Using that model we obtain estimates of a and
which are significantly nonzero by conventional levels, and of the anticipated
signs: both income and leisure are shown to be important determinants in-
creasing older workers' utility. In relative terms, the estimated coefficients
(a/B— 1.4/2.3 —.61)suggest that a percentage increase in leisure would be
weighed relatively more heavily than the same percentage increase in income.
We note in passing that the ordered logit model proves to be sensible on sta-
tistical grounds, since the data reject the hypothesis that the disturbance
terms are uncorrelated across individuals.9 Thus all policy evaluations
reported below utilize the theoretically and statistically preferable coef-
ficients from the ordered logit model.16
IV. Effects of Social Security Reforms on Retirement Ages
Predicting the effects of the Social Security reforms on retirement ages
requires three steps. First the OL coefficients are used to predict each sample
individual's probability of selecting all available retirement ages, under the
pre—reform budget set. Next we predict retirement ages under all four experi-
mental budget sets. Finally we average over individuals. Thus the results
appearing in the first column of Table 4 refer to averages over the sample as a
whole, not just to the illustrative worker described above.
We find that the estimated retirement age responses vary depending on the
experiment performed:
1. The largest retirement age response is observed for the experi-
ment which cuts benefits at the earliest retirement age while offering
a larger reward to continued work before, age 65 (Experiment D). The
likely response to this reform would be about a three month delay in
the retirement age, on average.
2. Intermediate retirement responses are observed for the experiment
which lowers benefits by approximately the same dollar amount at
every age but leaves unchanged the incentive to remain working an
additional year. This Is accomplished by changing the normal retire-
ment age (Experiment A). This would be predicted to delay retirement
by about one and a half months, on average.
3. The smallest responses are obtained in cases where income
incentives for early retirement are altered the least. This is true
for delaying cost—of—living adjustments (Experiment B), in which bene-
fits at each retirement age are reduced somewhat. It is also true of









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































since barly retirement benefits are unaffected and most workers retire
prior to age 65. Each of these reforms would be predicted to delay
retirement by less than a week, on average.
Overall, the four policies simulated here generate only very small
changes in retirement behavior———changes in lifetime income of as much as
twenty to thirty percent at some ages would result in at most a three month
deferral.1°
Ourfindingsare generically similar to those generated from
other empirical models of older workers' labor supply. Burtless and Moffitt's
(1982) results are of the same order of magnitude as ours; their model indicates
that changing Social Security benefits by ten percent would affect retirement
ages by about one month. Hausman and Wise (1983) evaluate how retirement ages
would differ if Social Security primary insurance amounts (PIA) had remained
constant front 1969 onwards instead of increasing as they did until 1975. This
counterfactual simulation indicates that retirement at age 62 would not have
been affected at all; only 3% fewer people would have retired at age 65 and
about 4% fewer at age 66. Since the actual PIA increase was on the order of 50%
over that period, these estimated responses prove to be quite small indeed.
Finally, Gustman and Steinmeier (1983) estimate the effects of raising the
normal retirement age for Social Security benefits from 65 to 67. This reduces
early benefits by 10 to 13 1/3 percentage points in each year. They estimate
that the two year increase in the normal retirement age would increase actual
retirement by about two months; this is somewhat larger than our prediction that
a three—year increase in the normal retirement age would increase actual
retirement by about 1.6 months, but both are very small. Likewise, they find as
we do that the cost—of—living adjustment deferral is expected to raise actual
retirement by less than one month.19
In sum; the numbers that emerge from our study are very close toothers
estimates. We all find very small elasticities of retirement age with respect
to changes in Social Security benefits: on the order of 0.1 or less.All of
these behavioral estimates are an order of magnitude smaller than actuarial
assumptions made by functionaries of the Social Security system.Schieber
(1982) is particularly clear on the assumptions made by Social Security ac-
tuaries. Regarding the reform in which the normal retirement age israised from
65 to 68 he says: "The average age at retirement for men is assumed torise
to 65.6 years at the end of the transition, which contrastswith an average
retirement age of 63.2 years at the beginning of the simulation." p.190
[Emphasis added.] Thus, the Social Security actuaries were assuming a2.3 year
response to a three year increase inthe normal retirement age. Our behavioral
evidence suggests that this assumption is unwarranted and thatthe probable
response is no more than a tenth ofthat.
The small retirement age responses predicted from behavioralmodels have
implications for the financial viability of theSocial Security system and of
workers. First, looking at the Social Security system, the averageworker is
predicted to make only a marginal change in respo.iseto a downward shift in
benefit formulas. This means that the Social Security systemwill have to pay
out less to the worker over his lifetime. Furthermore,during the weeks or
months of extra work, the system gains additional revenues.The system
therefore comes out ahead from these reforms.
Does the financial gain to the Social Security systemnecessarily imply a
corresponding financial loss to Social Security recipients?Not necessarily, if
workers respond as the actuaries assume and extend theirworklives by enough to
retain their old benefit levels. However, thebehavioral evidence from several
models including ours suggests otherwise. Olderworkers will not give up much20
leisure. Consequently, the models predict that workers will be rendered poorer.
We turn now to estimates of the changes in incomes of retirees.
V. Effects of Social Security Reforms on Retirement Incomes
Table 4 also indicates how each of the four experiments would alter a
retiree's Social Security benefits (PDVSS) and total income (PDVY). Two sets of
calculations are presented: one assumes the worker is employed until the
average retirement age prior to the reforms, and the other allows the retirement
age to respond to benefit changes.
At the mean retirement age we find that the present value of Social
Security benefits would be reduced by as much as 22%. A reduction in PDVSS of
this magnitude occurs in Experiment A, which increases the normal retirement
age, leaves the early retirement age unchanged, and maintains the gain for
working an extra year (hereafter, the "tilt") at 6 2/3% per annum.
At the mean retirement age, the present value of remaining lifetime income
would be reduced by as much as 10%. Once again, the largest reduction is found
for Experiment A. The PDVY reductions are smaller than the corresponding PDVSS
reductions because PDVSS is just one component of PDVY.
After allowing for the average retirement age to respond to changes in the
Social Security benefit structure, PDVSS would still fall by as much as 22% and
PDVY by 9% under Experiment A. The effects are largest under this experiment
for two reasons: (i) Experiment A reduces early retirement benefits a great
deal, and (ii) Experiment A retains a small incentive for prolonged work.
For the experiment which lowers early retirement benefits while keeping
normal benefits the same (Experiment C) the percentage reduction in PDVY is less
after allowing for retirement age endogeneity than when retirement ages are held
constant. This experiment increases the tilt in the benefit structure as well21
as reducing Social Security benefits at any given age. The consequent labor
supply response would offset about half of the lifetime income reduction that
would otherwise take place.
In the other experiments, retirement ages do not change appreciably 80 that
the effects on PDVSS and PDVY are the same when the retirement age is allowed to
vary as when it is taken as exogenously determined.
VI. Conclusions
This paper evaluated the likely responses of older workers to four reforms
in the Social Security benefit formulas: 'increasing the normal retirement age,
delaying the cost—of—living adjustment, raising the late retirement credit, and
changing the early retirement reduction factor. We first developed workers'
intertemporal budget sets prior to and after the reforms. Next, we evaluated
how retirement behavior might respond to these new economic incentives.
Finally, new retirement ages and retirement incomes were compared with pre—
reform levels. Clearly this approach is readily adaptable to other reform
proposals and even other retirement income systems.
For the particular reforms examined here, the largest response is observed
for the experiment which cuts benefits at the earliest ages, while offering
larger rewards to continued work. The likely response for this change would be
about a three month delay in the average retirement age. An intermediate
change, of about one and a half months, was predicted in response to increasing
the normal retirement age. Very small responses, of less than one week, were
obtained for delays in the cost—of—living adjustment or raising the late retire-
ment credit, both of which altered income incentives the least.22
Responses of these magnitudes will be too small to compensate retirees for
reductions in benefit formulas. Thus, smaller Social Security benefits will be
paid to workers. The cut is largest for increases in the normal retirement age,
next largest for decreases in early retirement benefits. The Social Security
system's financial burden will be eased, but retirees' incomes will fall on
average.23
ENDNOTES
1. Our analysis with other data sets has indicated that this definition of
retirement produces estimates of behavioral responses that are virtually
identical to those generated from other definitions of retirement; see
Fields and Mitchell (l984b).
2. Reported earnings up to the Social Security taxable earnings maximum were
converted to estimated earnings using a procedure reported in Fields and
Mitchell (1984a).
3. The income tax computations assume that each married worker files jointly
with his spouse. Actual taxes paid are not reported in the data file.
Data on private pension contributions are likewise not reported. However,
most workers do not contribute directly to their company—sponsored pension
plan, implying that this omission is not serious.
4. These rules appear In the Social Security Administration's Social Security
Handbook.
5. Again it was assumed that the married retiree filed jointly with his spouse.
6. In these calculations, the earnings and private pension elements of the
underlying budget set are assumed to be unaffected by changes in Social
Security legislation. Accordingly, the estimated effects of the various
policy reforms on retirement ages should be thought of as first—round
estimates. Future research should consider the responses of pension
plans and earnings profiles to Social Security reforms.24
7. This form for the utility function is consistent with evidence indicating
that the substitution elasticity for older workers is very close to —1; see
Gustman and Steinmeier (1983).
8. This model, due to Small (1982), is described in more detail in Mitchell and
Fields (l984a). Essentially the probability of selecting retirement age j
from among several ordered alternatives is described as:
exp(a in PDVYJ+ bin RET +N3)
Pj =K
E exp(a in PDVYk +bin RETk +
whereNk—l/2[in (1/2) +in(1 + + in(1 +
andP° the probability of selecting retirement age k in a conven-
tional inuitinomial iogit model. As is always the case in logit models, the
coefficients are identified up to a factor of proportionality only (e.g. the
utility of alternative states relative to one particular state used as the
standard of comparison).
9. Both the Small (1981) test and the Hausman—NcFadden test (1981) described in
Mitchell and Fields (1984a) reject the hypothesis that the ordered logit
coefficients are identical to those that would be obtained using an ordinary
multinomial logit model.
10. Simulations using coefficients from a conventional niultinomial logit (MNL)
model were also evaluated for three of the four experiments. The two sets
of results differed by less than one month in all cases: Experiment A, +1.6
months in OL versus +2.0 in MNL; Experiment C, +0.2 months in OL versus +0.3
months in MNL; Experiment D, +2.9 months in OL versus +3.6 months in MNL.25
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